Jim Rogers on Opportunities in Russia and Other Hated Markets

By Nick Giambruno

Nick Giambruno: Welcome, Jim. As you know, Doug Casey and I travel the world surveying crisis markets, and we always like to get your take on things. Today I want to talk to you about Russia, which is a very hated market right now. What are your thoughts on Russia in general and on Russian stocks in particular?

Jim Rogers: Well, I’m optimistic about the future of Russia. I was optimistic before this war started in Ukraine, which was instigated by the US, of course. But in any case, I bought more Russia during the Crimea incident, and I’m looking to buy still more.

Unfortunately, what’s happening is certainly not good for the United States. It’s driving Russia and Asia together, which means we’re going to suffer in the long run—the US and Europe. Another of the big four Chinese banks opened a branch in Moscow recently. The Iranians are getting closer to the Russians. The Russians recently finished a railroad into North Korea down to the Port Rason, which is the northernmost ice-free port in Asia. The Russians have put a lot of money into the Trans-Siberian railroad to update it and upgrade it, all of which goes right by China.

Usually, people who do a lot of business together wind up doing other things together, such as fighting wars, but this isn’t any kind of immediate development. I don’t think the Russians, the Chinese, and the Iranians are about to invade America.

Nick: So because of these economic ties to Asia, the Russians are not as dependent on the West. Is that why you’re optimistic about Russia?

Jim: I first went to the Soviet Union in 1966, and I came away very pessimistic. And I was pessimistic for the next 47 years, because I didn’t see how it could possibly work. But then I started noticing, a year or two ago, that now everybody hates Russia—the market is not at all interesting to anybody anymore.

You may remember in the 1990s, and even the first decade of this century, everybody was enthusiastic about Russia. Lots of people had periodic bouts of huge enthusiasm. I was short the ruble in 1998, but other than that, I had never invested in Russia, certainly not on the long side. But a year or two ago I started noticing that things are changing in Russia… something is going on in the Kremlin. They understand they can’t just shoot people, confiscate people’s assets. They have to play by the rules if they want to develop their economy.

Now Russia has a convertible currency—and most countries don’t have convertible currencies, but the Russians do. They have fairly large foreign currency reserves and are building up more assets. Having driven across Russia a couple of times, I know they have vast natural resources. And now that the Trans-Siberian Railway has been rebuilt, it’s a huge asset as well.

So I see all these things. I knew the market was depressed, knew nobody liked it, so I started looking for and finding a few investments in Russia.

Nick: Yeah, that definitely seems to make sense when you look at the sentiment and long-term fundamentals. So where do you see the conflict with Ukraine and the tensions with the West going?

Jim: Well, the tensions are going to continue to grow, at least as long as you have the same bureaucrats in Washington. You know, they all have a professional stake in making sure that things don’t calm down in the former Soviet Union—so I don’t see things getting better any time soon.

I do notice that some companies and even countries have started pulling back from the sanctions. Many companies and people are starting to say, “Wait a minute, what is all this about?”

People are starting to reexamine the propaganda that comes out of Washington. Even the Germans are starting to reassess the situation. I suspect that things will cool off eventually, because the U.S. doesn’t have much support and they’ve got plenty of other wars they want to fight or are keen to get started.

So Russia will become more and more dominant in Ukraine. The east is more or less Russian. Crimea was always Russian until Khrushchev got drunk one night and gave it away. So I suspect you will see more and more disintegration of Ukraine, which by the way is good for Ukraine and good for the world.

We don’t complain when the Scots have an election as to whether they want to leave the UK or not. People in Spain want to leave. We say we’re in favor of self-determination. We let Czechoslovakia break up, Yugoslavia break up, Ethiopia break up. These things are usually good. Many borders that exist are historic anomalies, and they should break up. Just because something happened after the First World War or Second World War and some bureaucrats drew a border doesn’t mean it’s logical or should survive.

So I suspect you will see more of eastern Ukraine becoming more and more Russian. I don’t see America going to war, I certainly don’t see Europe going to war over Ukraine, and so America will just sort of slowly slide away and have to admit another miscalculation.

Nick: I agree. Would you also say that Europe’s dependence on Russia for energy limits how far the sanctions can go? There’s been speculation that the Europeans are going to cut Russia out of the SWIFT system, like they did with Iran.

Jim: Well, anything can happen. I noticed SWIFT’s reaction when America tried to force them to do that: they were not very happy at all. I’m an American citizen like you, and unfortunately the bigger picture is forcing the Russians, the Chinese, and others to accelerate in finding an alternative. That is not good for the US.

The Americans have a monopoly, because everyone who uses dollars has to get them cleared through New York. People were already starting to worry in the past few years about the American dominance of the system and its ability to just close everything down.

So now the Russians and Chinese and others are accelerating their efforts to find an alternative to SWIFT and to the American dollar and the dominance of the US financial system. As I said earlier, none of this is good for the US. We think we’re hurting the Russians. We are actually hurting ourselves very badly in the long term.

Nick: I think one area where you can really see this is that the US essentially kicked Russia out of Visa and MasterCard. And what did Russia do? They turned to China UnionPay, which is China’s payment processor.

Jim: We could go on and on. There are things that have happened, and everything is underway now because Putin has told everybody, “Okay, we’ve got to reexamine our whole way of life that has evolved since the Berlin Wall fell,” and that’s one of the things. By the way, the Chinese love all of this. It’s certainly good for China. It’s not good for the US in the end, but it’s great for China and some Asian countries, such as Iran.

Nothing we have done has been good for America since this whole thing started—nothing. Everything we’ve done has been good for the Chinese.

Nick: So why are they doing it?

Jim: You know as well as I do: these are bureaucrats who shouldn’t be there in the first place. Power corrupts, and it has. You look at the beginning of the First World War, the Emperor, who was 85 years old at the time, made nine demands on the Serbians. Serbia met eight of his demands. For whatever reason they couldn’t meet the ninth. And so they said, “Okay, that’s it… war.” And then everybody was at war.

The bureaucrats everywhere piled in with great enthusiasm—great headlines about how the war will be over by Christmas. By the way, whenever wars start, the headlines always say the war will be over by Christmas, at least in Christian nations. But six months after that war started, everybody looked around and said, “What the hell are we doing?” This is madness. Millions of people are being killed. Billions of dollars are being lost.

This is not good for anybody. And why did it start? Nobody could even tell you why it started, but unfortunately it went on for four years with massive amounts of destruction, all because a few bureaucrats and an old man couldn’t get their acts together. None of that was necessary. Nearly all wars start like that. If you examine the beginning of any war, years later you ask, “How did it happen? Why did it happen?” And usually there’s not much explanation. The winners write history, so the winners always have a good explanation, but more objective people are usually confused.

Nick: Excellent points that you make, Jim. I want to shift gears a little bit. I know you’re a fan of agriculture, and parts of Russia and Ukraine are among the most fertile regions in the world. Investing there is a nice way to get into agriculture and also Russia at the same time. What do you think about companies and stocks that own and operate farmland in that region?

Jim: Well, historically you’re right. Ukraine was one of the major breadbaskets of the world, and some of those vast Russian lands were great breadbaskets at times in history. Communism can and does ruin everything it touches. It ruined Soviet agriculture, but many of those places have great potential and will revive.

I haven’t actually gone and examined the soil myself to see that it’s still fertile, but I assume it is because you see the production numbers. That part of the world should be and will be great agricultural producers again. It’s just a question of when and who.

By the way, I have recently become a director of a large Russian phosphorous/fertilizer company, partly for the reasons you’re discussing.

(Editor’s Note: We recently discussed how investors can access agricultural investment opportunities in Russia. There's an accessible stock that makes it easy to do just that. For all the details, you may want to check out Crisis Speculator.)

Nick: We were talking about Russia and Iran. I’ve had the chance to travel to Iran. It has a remarkably vibrant stock market, all things considered. It’s not heavily dependent on natural resources. They have consumer goods companies, tech companies, and so forth.

Do you see the potential for Iran to open up anytime soon, maybe a Nixon-goes-to-China moment?

Jim: I bought Iranian shares in 1993, and over the next few years it went up something like 47 times, so it was an astonishing success. I got a lot of my money out, but some of it is still trapped there. I don’t know if I could ever find it, but I took so much out it didn’t really matter.

Yes, I know that there’s an interesting market there. I know there’s a vibrant society there. I know huge numbers of Iranians who are under 30, and they want to live a different life. It is changing slowly, but it’s in the process.

Part of it, of course, is because the West has characterized them as demons and evil, which makes it harder. I was never very keen on things like that. Throughout history and in my own experience, engagement is usually a better way to change things than ignoring people and forcing them to close in and get bitter about the outside world.

So I don’t particularly approve of our approach or anybody’s approach to Iran. I certainly don’t approve of old man Khamenei’s approach to Iran either. There were mistakes made in the early days on both sides. But that’s all changing now. I see great opportunities in Iran. If they don’t open to the West, they’re going to open to Asia and to Russia.

There are fabulous opportunities in Iran, with over 70 million people, vast assets, lots of entrepreneur-type people, smart people, and educated people. Iran is Persia. Persia was one of the great nations of world history for many centuries.

So it’s not as though they were a bunch of backward people sitting over there who can’t read or find other people on the map. Persia has enormous potential, and they will develop it again.

Nick: I completely agree, and we’re looking at Iran closely, too. If the West doesn’t open up to Iran, it’s going to lose out to the Chinese and the Russians, who are going to gobble up that opportunity and really eat the Americans’ lunch.

Of course with the sanctions, it’s pretty much illegal for Americans to invest in Iran right now.

Jim: That wasn’t always the case. Years ago, if the investment was less than a certain amount of money, and some other things, there were no problems. I don’t know the details of the current law.

Nick: It’s difficult to keep up with, because the story is constantly changing.

Jim: Well, that’s the brilliance of bureaucrats; they always have something to do. It gives them ongoing job security.

Nick: Exactly.

Nick: Another place we have on our list is Kurdistan.

Jim: The Kurds have been a pretty powerful group of people for a long time. I hope they can pull it together. An independent Kurdistan would be good for Turkey and good for everybody else. Unfortunately, again, you have all these bureaucrats who don’t like change.

I’ve certainly got it on my radar, and maybe I’ll bump into you in Iran, or Russia, or Kurdistan, or who knows where.

Nick: Sounds good Jim, we’ll be in touch.

Editor’s Note: This was an excerpt from Crisis Speculator, which uncovers the deep value investment opportunities waiting behind the news that frightens others away.

The article was originally published at internationalman.com.

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The Madness of the EU’s Energy Policy

By Marin Katusa, Chief Energy Investment Strategist

The stakes couldn’t be higher. Vladimir Putin has launched a devastating plan to turn Russia into an energy powerhouse. And Europe, dependent on Russian natural gas and oil for a third of its fuel needs, has fallen right into his hands: Putin can bend the EU to his will simply by twisting the valve shut.

Considering how precarious Europe’s economic security is, one would have thought that now would be a good time for the EU to reassess its energy policy and address the effect crippling energy costs are having on its struggling economy. But the EU is never going to agree to a rational reappraisal of its policies, because eco-loons like its new energy commissioner, Violetta Bulc, have taken over the asylum.

A practicing fire walker and a shaman, she’s the sort of airy fairy Goddard College type who only believes in the power of “positive energy.” What will guide us in this frightening new era is, according to her blog, the spirit of the White Lions:

The Legend says that White Lions are star beings, uniting star energy within earth form of Lions. The native ancestors were convinced that they are children of the Sun God, thus embodying Solar Logos and legends say that they came down to Earth to help save humanity at a time of crisis. There is no doubt that this time is right now.

With the European Commission stuffed with green anti capitalist zealots, it’s not surprising that the EU’s response to the challenges of a resurgent Russia is a complete break with reality.

The EU has come up with an aggressive climate plan—just like Obama’s. In defiance of all logic—if not Putin—it’s agreed to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 40% and make clean energy, like wind and solar, 27% of overall energy use by 2030. Instead of guaranteeing the “survival of mankind,” this would cause the extinction of Europe’s industry—unless there’s a secret plan to massively expand nuclear power.

Fortunately for Europe, its leaders haven’t yet lost all their marbles.

These climate goals are just a bargaining chip in the runup to next year’s UN climate summit in Paris. They’re not legally binding. Unless the whole world commits to an equally radical policy of deindustrialization—which seems rather unlikely to say the least—the EU will “review” its climate targets.

This is just as well. In trying to meet the so-called 20:20 target—a 20% reduction in emissions by 2020—Germany and the UK have already discovered that renewable energy is too costly to maintain a competitive industry. As electricity prices skyrocket, Germany’s industrial giants are either having their power costs subsidized or are relocating to the US.

Both countries are struggling with the inability of wind and solar energy to provide reliable baseload power, which is threatening to cause blackouts.

The UK is putting its faith in fracking—and has managed to head off any EU legislation to ban shale-gas. But Germany and its fellow travelers, who have no qualms about reverting to coal, are simply overriding the EU Commission and its zero emissions utopia.

Knowing that EU climate policy would destroy international competitiveness and crush their economies, Poland, which depends on coal for 90% of its energy needs, and other low-income countries have taken a different approach. They've forced the Commission to give them special exemptions from any emissions reduction plan.

Unlike in the U.S.—where Obama is taking executive action to wipe out the coal industry—lignite, or brown coal, is set to become an increasingly important part of Europe’s energy supply, as it is in much of the rest of the world. There are 19 new lignite power stations in various stages of approval and construction in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Germany, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia. When completed, these will emit nearly as much CO₂ as the UK.

Which is ironic. The UK is the only member of the EU to have been insane enough to impose a legally binding carbon dioxide reduction target intended to take it to 80 percent of 1990 levels by 2050. It’s also the only modern industrial nation where there’s serious talk of World War II style energy rationing.

As you’ll discover in my new book, The Colder War, Europe and America need to wake up. They’ve never been so economically vulnerable. The time for indulging environmental fantasies and putting one’s faith in White Lions is over—unless, that is, you want to see Putin controlling the world.

Click here to get your copy of my new book. Inside, you’ll discover exactly how Putin is orchestrating a takeover of the global energy trade, what it means for the future of America, and how it will directly affect you and your personal savings.

The article The Madness of the EU’s Energy Policy was originally published at casey research

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The Four Horsemen of the Geopolitical Apocalypse

By John Mauldin

Ian Bremmer, NYU professor and head of the geopolitical consulting powerhouse Eurasia Group, consults at the highest levels with both governments and companies because he brings to the table robust geopolitical analysis and a compelling thesis: that we are witnessing “the creative destruction of the old geopolitical order.” We live, as his last book told us, in a “G-0” world. In today’s Outside the Box, Ian spells out what that creative destruction means in terms of events on the ground today. As Ian notes, the most prominent feature of the international landscape this year has been the expansion of geopolitical conflict. That expansion is gaining momentum, he says, creating larger-scale crises and sharpening market volatility. Hold on to the reins now as Ian take us for a ride with the “Four Horsemen of the Geopolitical Apocalypse.”

We’ll follow up Ian’s piece with an excellent short analysis of the Iraq situation from a Middle East expert at a large hedge fund I correspond with. Pretty straightforward take on the situation with regard to ISIS. This quagmire has real implications for the world oil supply. (It appears that the Sunni rebel forces are now in complete control of the key Baiji Refinery, which produces a third of Iraq’s output.)

Back in Dallas, it’s a little hard to focus on geopolitical events when seemingly all the news is about ongoing domestic crises. But the outrageous IRS loss of emails doesn’t really affect our portfolios all that much. What happens in Iraq or with China does. There’s just not the emotional impact.

One domestic humanitarian crisis that is brewing just south of me is the massive influx of very young children across the U.S.-Mexican border. When this was first brought to my attention a few weeks ago, I must admit that I questioned the credibility of the source. We have had young children walking across the Texas border for decades but always in rather small numbers. The first source I read said that 40,000 had already come over this year. I just found that to be non credible, but then with a little reasonable research it not only became believable but could be a bit low – it looks as many as 90,000 children will cross the border this year.

What in the name of the Wide Wide World of Sports is going on? First of all, how do you cover up something of this magnitude until it is a true crisis? When the administration and other authorities clearly knew about it last year? (The evidence is irrefutable. They knew.)

I am the father of five adopted children. In an earlier phase of my life, I was somewhat involved with Child Protective Services here in Texas. It was an emotionally difficult and heartrending experience. (One of my children came out of that system and three from outside of the United States). I have no idea how you care for 90,000 children who don’t speak the language and have no connection to their new locale. Forget the dollar cost, which could run into the tens of billions over time. These are children, and they are on our doorstep and our watch. You simply can’t ignore them and say, “They are not supposed to be here, so it’s not our responsibility.” They are children. Someone, and that means here in the U.S., is going to have to figure out how to take care of them, even if it is only to learn why they try to come and figure out where to send them back to. And frankly, trying to to send them back is going to be a logistical and legal nightmare, not to mention psychologically traumatic to the children.

Maybe someone thought that waiting until there was a crisis to let this information slip out (and we found out about it because of photos posted anonymously of children packed together in holding cells) would create momentum for immigration reform. And they may be right. But I’m not certain it’s going to result in the type of immigration reform they were hoping to get.

I have to admit that I’ve been rather tolerant of illegal immigrants over the course of my life. There are a dozen or so key issues that I think this country should focus on, but I’ve just never gotten that worked up about illegal immigration. The simple fact is that everyone here in the US is either an immigrant or descended from immigrants. It may be, too, that I’ve hired a few undocumented workers here and there in my life. As an economist, I know that we should be trying to figure out how to get more capable immigrants here, not less. What you want are educated young people who are motivated to create and work, not children as young as four or five years old who are going to need housing, education, adult supervision, health care, and most of all a loving environment where they can grow up.

It is one thing for undocumented workers to come across the border looking for jobs or for families to come across together. It is a completely different matter when tens of thousands of preteen children come across the border without parents or supervision. They didn’t get across 1500 miles of desert without significant support and a great deal of planning. This couldn’t be happening without the awareness of authorities in Mexico and the Central American countries from which these children come, and if this is truly a surprise to Homeland Security, then there is a significant failure somewhere in the system.

And if it was not a surprise? That begs a whole different series of questions.

This is a major humanitarian crisis, and it is not in the Middle East or Africa. It is on our border, and we need to figure out what to do about it NOW!

I don’t care whether you think we need to build a 20 foot high wall across the southern border of the United States or give amnesty to anyone who wants to come in (or both), something has to be done with these children. It is a staggering problem of enormous logistical proportions, and we have a simple human responsibility to take care of those who cannot take care of themselves.

And on that note I will go ahead and hit the send button, and let’s focus on the critical geopolitical events happening around the globe. Iraq is a disaster. Ukraine is a crisis. What’s happening in the China Sea is troubling. It just seems to come at you from everywhere. Even on a beautiful summer day.

Your stunned by the magnitude of it all at analyst,

John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box

---

(From Ian Bremmer)

Dear John,
We're halfway through 2014, and the single most notable feature of the international landscape has been the expansion of geopolitical conflict. why should we care? what's the impact; what does it mean for the global economy? how should we think about geopolitics? My thoughts on the topic, looking at the four key geopolitical pieces "in play"–in Eurasia, the middle east, Asia, and the transatlantic.

Geopolitics

 

I've written for several years about the root causes of the geopolitical instability the world is presently experiencing. a new, g-zero world where the united states is less interested in providing global leadership and nobody else is willing or able to step into that role. that primary leadership vacuum is set against a context of competing foreign policy priorities from increasingly powerful emerging markets (with very different political and economic systems) and a Germany-led Europe; challenges to the international system from a revisionist Russia in decline; and difficulties in coordination from a proliferation of relevant state and non state actors even when interests are aligned. all of this has stirred tensions in the aftermath of the financial crisis: instability across the middle east after a stillborn Arab spring; a three-year Syrian civil war; a failed Russia "reset"; rising conflict between china and japan; fraying American alliances with countries like Brazil, Germany, and Saudi Arabia.

And yet geopolitical concerns haven't particularly changed our views on global markets. each conflict has been small and self contained (or the spillover wasn't perceived to matter much). Geopolitics has been troubling on the margins but not worth more than a fret.

That's about to change. though perceived as discrete events, the rise of these geopolitical tensions are all directly linked to the creative destruction of the old geopolitical order. it's a process that's gaining momentum, creating in turn larger-scale crises and broader market volatility. we've now reached the point where near to mid-term outcomes of several geopolitical conflicts could become major drivers of the global economy. that's true of Russia/Ukraine, Iraq, the east and south china seas and U.S./Europe. in each, the status quo is unsustainable (though for very different reasons). and so, as it were, the four horsemen of the geopolitical apocalypse.

Russia/Ukraine

 

The prospect of losing Ukraine was the last straw for a Russian government that has been steadily losing geopolitical influence since the collapse of the soviet union over two decades ago. Moscow sees NATO enlargement, expanded European economic integration, energy diversification and the energy revolution as direct security threats that need to be countered. Ukraine is also an opportunity for the Kremlin...for president Putin to invigorate a flagging support base at home.

Putin intends to raise the economic and military pressure on Kiev until, at a minimum, southeast Ukraine is effectively under Russian control. the Ukrainian government's latest effort in response, a unilateral week long cease fire in the southeast, was greeted with lukewarm rhetoric by Putin and rejected by Russian separatists in the region, who escalated their attacks against the Ukrainian military. meanwhile, thousands of Russian troops recently pulled back from the Ukrainian border have now been redeployed there, bolstered by Putin ordering 65,000 Russian troops on combat alert in the region.

The choices for Kiev are thankless. if they press further, violence intensifies and Russian support expands, either routing the Ukrainian military, or taking serious losses and requiring direct "formal" intervention of Russian troops. if they back off, they lose the southeast, which is critical for their internal legitimacy from the Ukrainian population at large. all the while the Ukrainian economy teeters with much of their industrial base off line, compounded by Russian disruptions on customs, trade, and gas supply.

The growing conflict will lead to further deterioration of Russia's relationship with the united states and Europe: gas flow disruptions, expansion of defense spending and NATO coordination with Poland and the Baltic states, turbulence around Moldova and Georgia given their European association agreements this week...and "level 3" sectoral sanctions against Russia. that in turn means a serious economic downturn in Russia itself...and knock-on economic implications for Europe, which has far greater exposure to Russia than the united states does.

For the last several years, the major market concern for Europe was economic: the potential for collapse of the euro zone. that's no longer a worry. the primary risk to Europe is now clearly geopolitical, that expanded Russia/Ukraine conflict hurts Europe, in worst case pushing the continent back into recession.

Iraq

 

Like so much of the world's colonial legacy, many of the middle east's borders only "worked" because of the combination of secular authoritarian rule and international military and economic support. that was certainly true of Iraq–most recently under decades of control by the Baath party, beginning in 1963. Saddam Hussein's ouster forty years later by the united states and Great Britain, combined with the dismantling of nearly all of the military and political architecture that supported him (in dramatic contrast to, say, the ouster of Egypt's hosni Mubarak) undermined Iraq's territorial integrity. since then, Iraqi governance could still nominally function given significant American military presence and military and economic aid. once that was removed, there was little left to keep iraq functioning as a country.

Sectarianism is the primary form of allegiance in iraq today, both limiting the reach of prime minister nouri al maliki's majority shia government and creating closer ties between iraq's sunni, shia and kurdish populations and their brethren outside Iraq's borders. extremism within iraq has also grown dramatically as a consequence, particularly among the now disenfranchised sunni population--made worse by their heavy losses in the war against bashar assad across the largely undefended border with syria. the tipping point came with the broad attacks by the islamic state of iraq and syria (isis) over the past fortnight, speeding up a decade-long expansion of sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing between iraq's Sunni and shia. the comparatively wealthy and politically stable Kurds have done their best to steer clear of the troubles, seizing a long sought opportunity for de facto independence.

The American response has been cautious. domestic support for military engagement in Iraq diminished greatly as the war in Iraq continued and the economic and human costs mounted. obama repeatedly promised an end to the occupation and considered full withdrawal a major achievement of his administration. there's little domestic upside for taking responsibility in the crisis. obama's position has accordingly been that any direct military involvement requires a change in governance from the Iraqis--initially sounding like a unity government and increasingly evolving into the replacement of prime minister maliki. the pressure on maliki has gained momentum with shia grand ayatollah ali al-sistani calling on the iraqi prime minister to broaden the government to include more kurds and sunnis.

But Maliki, having successfully fought constitutional crises and assassination attempts, to say nothing of decisively winning a democratic election, is unlikely to go. isis poses a threat to the unity of the iraqi state, but not to maliki's rule of iraq's majority shia population, which if anything now stands stronger than it did before the fighting. and maliki's key international sponsor, iran, has little interest in forcing maliki into compromise as long as there's no threat to baghdad: they see themselves in far better strategic standing with a maliki-led iraqi government where they exert overwhelming influence, than over a broader government where they're one of many competing international forces. further, even if maliki were prepared to truly share power with iraq's kurds and sunni (something made more likely by the informal "influence" of 300 us military advisors now arriving in baghdad), he's unlikely to see much enthusiasm responding to that offer. the kurds are better off sticking to nominal (and a clearer road to eventual formal) independence; and sunni leaders that publicly find common cause with maliki would better hope all their family members aren't anywhere isis can find them.
absent american (or anyone else's) significant military engagement, the iraqi government is unlikely to be able to remove isis from leadership and, accordingly, reassert control over the sunni and kurdish areas of the country. that will lead to a significant increase in extremist violence emanating from the islamic world, a trend that's already deteriorated significantly in recent years (and since obama administration officials announced that cyberattacks were the biggest national security threat to the united states--a claim president obama overturned during his west point speech last month). since 2010, the number of known jihadist fighters has more than doubled; attacks by Al Qaeda affiliates have tripled.

The combination of challenging economic conditions, sectarian leadership, and the communications revolution empowering individuals through narrowing political and ideological demographic lenses all make this much more likely to expand. that's a greater threat to stability in the poorer middle eastern markets, but also will morph back into a growing terrorist threat against western assets in the region and more broadly. that creates, in turn, demand for increased security spending and bigger concerns about fat tail terrorism in the developed world, particularly in southern and western europe (where large numbers of unintegrated and unemployed islamic populations will pose more of a direct threat).

The broader risk is that sunni/shia conflict metastasizes into a single broader war. isis declares an islamic state across sunni iraq and syria, becoming ground zero for terrorist funding and recruitment from across the region. the saudi government condemns the absence of international engagement in either conflict and directly opposes an increasingly heavy and public iranian hand in iraqi and syrian rule. the united states completes a comprehensive nuclear deal with iran and declares victory (but doesn't work meaningfully with teheran on iraq), steering clear of the growing divide between the middle east's two major powers. the gulf cooperation council starts to fragment as members see opportunity in economic engagements with Iran. Iranian "advisers" in Iraq morph into armed forces; Saudi Arabia publicly opposes isis, but Saudi money and weapons get into their hands and an abundance of informal links pop up. militarization grows between an emboldened Iran and a more isolated, defensive Saudi Arabia. that's when the geopolitical premium around energy prices becomes serious.

East/South China Sea

 

Ukraine and Iraq are the two major active geopolitical conflicts. but there are two more geopolitical points of tension involving major economies that are becoming significant.

In Asia, it's the consequences of (and reactions to) an increasingly powerful and assertive china. the growth of china's influence remains the world's most important geopolitical story by a long margin. but, at least to date, china's growth is mostly an opportunity for the rest of the world. for the middle east, it's the principal new source of energy demand as the united states becomes more energy independent. for Africa, it's the best opportunity to build out long-needed infrastructure across the continent. for Europe and even the united states, it's a critical source of credit propping up currency, and a core producer of inexpensive goods. that's not to argue that there aren't significant caveats in each of these stories (or that those caveats aren't growing--they are), but rather that overall, china has been primarily perceived as an opportunity rather than a threat for all of these actors, and so it remains today.

for asia, a rising china has been seen more clearly as a double-edged sword. the greater comparative importance of the chinese economy has translated into more political influence (formal and informal) for beijing, at the expense of other governments in the region. meanwhile, china's dramatic military buildup has fundamentally changed the balance of power in asia; it's had negligible interest elsewhere.
china's military assertiveness has also grown in its backyard. in other regions, china continues to promote itself as a poor country that needs to focus on its own development and stability. in east and southeast asia china has core interests that it defends, and it is increasingly willing to challenge the status quo as its influence becomes asymmetrically greater.

that's been most clear with vietnam, where china first sent one oil rig to drill in contested waters directly off vietnam's shore--accompanied by several hundred chinese fishing vessels. they announced last week that they are repositioning four more. unsurprisingly, the vietnamese response has been sharp--anti-chinese demonstrations, violence, increased naval presence in the region, and coordination with the philippines.
none of that creates significant political risk on its own: vietnam isn't an ally of the united states and so engenders less support and response from washington than the philippines or japan...which is precisely why beijing has decided that's the best place to start changing the regional security balance.

but tokyo feels differently. the japanese government understands that a rising china is longer term a much more existential threat to its own security position in asia, and it isn't prepared to wait to raise concern until its position weakens further. so prime minister shinzo abe has declared his security support for vietnam. for america's part, obama has jettisoned the official "pivot" to asia. but the administration continues to believe that america's core national security interests, now and in the future, are in asia; and if china significantly escalates tensions in the east and south china seas, the united states is not likely to sit as idly by as they have on syria or ukraine.

the good news here is that--unlike with the countries driving the tensions in eurasia and the middle east--china has solid political stability and isn't looking for international trouble. but the realities of chinese growth, coupled with strong leadership from japan and (over time) india, along with the persistence of a strong american footprint are contributing to a much more troublesome geopolitical environment in the region.
the principle danger to the markets is what happens if the chinese government no longer holds that perspective. president xi jinping's commitment to transformational economic reform has been strong over the first year of his rule, and he has gotten surprisingly little pushback from the country's entrenched elites. but the uncertainty around china's near- to medium-term trajectory is radically greater than that of any of the world's other major economies. should significant instability emerge in china, very plausible indeed, china's willingness to take on a far more assertive (and risk-acceptant) security strategy in the region, promoting nationalism in the way putin has built his support base of late, would become far more likely. and then, the east and south china seas move to the top of our list.

U.S.-Europe

 

finally, the transatlantic relationship. advanced industrial economies with consolidated institutions and political stability, there's none of the geopolitical conflict presently visible in the middle east, eurasia, or asia.

geopolitical tensions have long been absent from the transatlantic relationship, the great success of the nato alliance. for all the occasional disagreement in europe on us military and security policy both during the cold war and since (the war in iraq, israel/palestine, counterterrorism and the like), european states never considered the need for broader security ties as a counterbalance for nato membership.

but the changing nature of geopolitics is creating a rift between the united states and europe.
american global hegemony had security and economic components, and it was collective security that had been the core element holding together the transatlantic alliance. that's no longer the case--a consequence of changing priorities for the americans and europeans, and an evolving world order (russia/ukraine a major blip, but notwithstanding). the transatlantic relationship is much less closely aligned on economics.

it's not the conventional wisdom. most observers say that, after bush, american policy looks more european these days--less militarist, more multilateralist. but actually, us foreign policy isn't becoming more like europe, it's becoming more like china. it's less focused on the military, except on issues of core security concern (in which case the united states acts with little need to consult allies), while american economic policy tends to be unilateralist in supporting preferred american geopolitical outcomes--which is seen most directly in us sanctions behavior (over $15bn in fines now levied against more than 20 international banks--mostly european) and nsa surveillance policy (with no willingness of the us to cooperate in a germany requested "no spying" mutual agreement)

transatlantic economic dissonance is also in evidence in a number of more fundamental ways: america's "growth uber alles" approach to a downturn in the economy, compared to germany's fixation on fiscal accountability. europe's greater alignment between governments and corporations on industrial policy, as opposed to a more decentralized, private-sector led (and occasionally captured) american policy environment. a more economy-driven opportunistic european approach to china, russia and other developing markets; the us government looking focused more on us-led/"universalist" principles on industrial espionage, intellectual property, etc.

as the g-zero persists, we will see the united states looking to enforce more unilateral economic standards that the europeans resent and resist; while the europeans look to other countries more strategically as counterbalances to american economic hegemony (the german-china relationship is critical in this regard, but that's also true of europe's willingness to support american economic policies in russia and the middle east). all of this means a much less cooperative trans-atlantic relationship--less "universalism" (from the american perspective) and less "multilateralism" (from the european perspective). more zero-sumness in the transatlantic relationship is a big change in the geopolitical environment; a precursor to true multipolarity, but in the interim a more fragmented and much less efficient global marketplace.

* * *

so that's where i see geopolitics emerging as a key factor for the global markets--much more than at any time since the end of the cold war. there's some good news and bad news here.

the good news is none of these geopolitical risks are likely to have the sort of market implications that the macro economic risks did after the financial crisis. there are lots of reasons for that. a low interest rate environment and solid growth from the us and china--plus the eurozone out of recession--along with pent up demand for investment is leading to significant optimism that won't be easily cowed by geopolitics. the supply/demand energy story is largely bearish, so near-term geopolitical risks from the middle east won't create sustained high prices. and markets don't know how to price geopolitical risk well; they're not covered as clearly analytically, so investors don't pay as much attention (until/unless they have to).

the bad news...that very lack of pressure from the markets means political leaders won't feel as much need to address these crises even as they expand, particularly in the united states. this is another reason the world's geopolitical crises will persist beyond a level that a similar economic crisis would hit before serious measures start to be taken to mitigate them. these geopolitical factors are going to grow. now's the time to start paying attention to them.

* * *
every once in a while, it's good to take a step back and look at the big picture. hope you found that worthwhile. i'll surely get back in the weeds next monday.

meanwhile, it's looking like a decidedly lovely week in new york.
very best,
Ian

From intel sources:

Dislodging ISIS Will Be a Difficult Task

 

The ISIS advance toward Baghdad may be temporarily held off as the government rallies its remaining security forces and Shia militias organize for the upcoming Battle for Baghdad. There is a rather clear reason why the ISIS leader has renamed himself Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, meaning the Caliph of Baghdad . ISIS will at a minimum be able to take control of some Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad shortly and wreak havoc on the city with IEDs, ambushes, single suicide attacks, and suicide assaults that target civilians, the government, security forces, senior members of government, and foreign installations and embassies. Additionally, the brutal sectarian slaughter of Sunni and Shia alike that punctuated the violence in Baghdad from 2005 to 2007 is likely to return as Shia militias and ISIS fighters begin to assert control of neighborhoods and roam the streets.

Even if Iraqi forces are able to keep ISIS from fully taking Baghdad and areas south, it is unlikely the beleaguered military and police forces will be able to retake the areas under ISIS control in the north and west without significant external support, as well as the support of the Kurds.

ISIS and its allies are in a position today that closely resembles the position prior to the US surge back in early 2007. More than 130,000 US troops, partnered with the Sunni Awakening formations and Iraqi security forces numbering in the hundreds of thousands, were required to clear Anbar, Salahaddin, Diyala, Ninewa, Baghdad, and the "triangle of death." The concurrent operations took more than a year, and were supported by the US Air Force, US Army aviation brigades, and US special operations raids that targeted the jihadists’ command and control, training camps, and bases, as well as its IED and suicide bomb factories.

Today, the Iraqis have no US forces on the ground to support them, US air power is absent, the Awakening is scattered and disjointed, and the Iraqi military has been humiliated badly while surrendering or retreating in disarray during the lightning fast jihadists' campaign from Mosul to the outskirts of Baghdad. This campaign, by the way, has been remarkably and significantly faster than the U.S. armored campaign advance to Baghdad in 2003 . The US government has indicated that it will not deploy US soldiers in Iraq, either on the ground or at airbases to conduct air operations.  Meanwhile, significant amounts of US made advanced armaments, vehicles, ammunition, and diverse military equipment have fallen into ISIS jihadists’ hands .

ISIS is advancing boldly in the looming security vacuum left by the collapse of the Iraqi security forces and the West's refusal to recommit forces to stabilize Iraq. This has rendered the country vulnerable to further incursions by al Qaeda-linked jihadists as well as intervention by interested neighbors such as Iran. Overt Iranian intervention in Iraq would likely lead any Sunnis still loyal to the government to side with ISIS and its allies, and would ensure that Iraq would slide even closer to a full-blown civil war and de facto partition, and risk a wider war throughout the Middle East.

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The article Outside the Box: The Four Horsemen of the Geopolitical Apocalypse was originally published at Mauldin Economics

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Crimea.....River as markets tear up over Ukraine

By Grant Williams

An article from Grant on February 17, 2013

 (Marina Lewycka): Public clashes between Ukrainians and Russians in the main square in Sevastopol. Ukrainians protesting at Russian interference; Crimean Russians demanding the return of Sevastopol to Russia, and that parliament recognise Russian as the state language. Ukrainian deputies barred from the government building; a Russian "information centre" opening in Sevastopol. Calls from the Ukrainian ministry of defence for an end to the agreement dividing the Black Sea fleet between the Russian and Ukrainian navies. The move is labelled a political provocation by Russian deputies. 

The presidium of the Crimean parliament announces a referendum on Crimean independence, and the Russian deputy says that Russia is ready to supervise it. A leader of the Russian Society of Crimea threatens armed mutiny and the establishment of a Russian administration in Sevastopol. A Russian navy chief accuses Ukraine of converting some of his Black Sea fleet, and conducting armed assault on his personnel. He threatens to place the fleet on alert. The conflict escalates into terrorism, arson attacks and murder.

Sound familiar? All this happened in 1993, and it has been happening, in some form or other, since at least the 14th century.

So begins an article in the UK Guardian this week, written by a British novelist of Ukrainian origin, Marina Lewycka; and amidst all the furore surrounding the events in Ukraine these past couple of weeks, it's important to gain a little perspective in order to understand the history surrounding the country's fractious relationship with Russia and its recent dalliance with European suitors.

Source: Wikipedia

The key to the stand-off over Ukraine is the Crimean Peninsula — no stranger to conflict over the years and home to the infamous "Valley of Death" into which rode the 600 whom Tennyson commemorated in his epic poem recounting the ill-fated Charge of the Light Brigade. The order that sent those gallant young men to their inevitable doom is symptomatic of the kinds of catastrophic misjudgements that get made when emotions are running high.

At 10:45 a.m. on October 25th, 1854, the following order, signed by the Quartermaster General Richard Airey, was delivered to Field Marshall, Lord Lucan (no, not him. HE was the 7th Earl of Lucan. THIS was the 3rd Earl — his great, great grandfather):

Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front — follow the enemy and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns — Troop Horse Artillery may accompany — French cavalry is on your left. R Airey. Immediate.

The vagueness of Raglan's order confused Lucan, as it made no mention of which guns the Light Brigade were being ordered to keep from leaving the battlefield; but when he questioned the order, Captain Louis Nolan of the 15th The King's Hussars damned his impudence:

"Attack, sir!"
"Attack what? What guns, sir?"
"There, my Lord, is your enemy!" said Nolan indignantly, vaguely waving his arm eastwards. "There are your guns!"

And with that, not daring to challenge a direct order further, Lucan ordered the Earl of Cardigan to lead the 600 men of the 13th Light Dragoons, the 17th Lancers, the 11th Hussars, the 4th Light Dragoons, and the 8th Hussars into the teeth of the Russian battery two kilometres distant, with further guns flanking their advance on either side….

Cannon to right of them,

Cannon to left of them,

Cannon in front of them

Volley'd and thunder'd;

Storm'd at with shot and shell,

Boldly they rode and well,

Into the jaws of Death,

Into the mouth of Hell

Rode the six hundred.

The result of one of the most famous military blunders of all time, the destruction of the Light Brigade at the Battle of Balaclava, demonstrated the dangers of military miscalculation in the Crimea; and 160 years later the possibility of another such misjudgment on the part of a commander looms heavily over the region.
However, rather than tracing every twist and turn in the Crimea between 1854 and today, we shall focus on the more recent history of the isolated and vulnerable peninsula that juts out into the Black Sea from Ukraine's southern coastline; and, with a little help from the NY Times, we'll begin with a look at how things stood after the first week of the crisis….

Click here to continue reading this article from Things That Make You Go Hmmm… – a free weekly newsletter by Grant Williams, a highly respected financial expert and current portfolio and strategy advisor at Vulpes Investment Management in Singapore.

The article Things That Make You Go Hmmm: Crimea River was originally published at Mauldin Economics

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